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Monotheism and its Vicissitudes
K. Daniel Cho
Abstract Challenging the claim that monotheism is intolerant, 
the author presents an original interpretation of Sigmund Freud’s 
last book Moses and Monotheism. Freud is shown offering a theory 
of monotheism in which monotheism is not seen as exclusive, but 
rather as inherently equivocal.
1
Is monotheism intolerant? It would certainly seem so, if the media 
is any indication. Whenever the media reports on monotheism these 
days—whether it is a story about Christian conservatives fighting 
same-sex marriage legislation, a suicide bomber detonating an explo-
sive in the name of Islam, or an Orthodox Jew censoring women’s 
speech—it always seems it is because monotheism has reached a new 
low in intolerance. Of course, critics of monotheism will argue that 
there is nothing accidental about this inclination toward intolerance.1 
Monotheisms, they will point out, understand themselves to have an 
exclusive claim on the truth, a claim to which intolerance is integral 
and inevitable, for if a religion (or any system of thought, for that mat-
ter) understands itself to be the one and only truth, then it must, by 
necessity, reject, be intolerant of, all other accounts of the spiritual, the 
divine, and indeed the world itself, as so many falsehoods. Perhaps, 
monotheisms wouldn’t be so problematic if this exclusive understand-
ing of the truth (and of themselves) was purely a theoretical matter, 
but this is never the case. As the critics will argue, the exclusive under-
standing of the truth always finds its way to the world of practice, 
where it draws distinctions between peoples, practices, and cultures, 
holding one side up as normative and the other as aberrant. Indeed, 
as the critics will point out, it is from these practical distinctions that 
monotheistic truth draws its very meaning and power.2 Perhaps, such 
distinctions were useful once upon a time when religions served as 
the common framework that knit disparate peoples and populations 
together into a single society, but now they are completely useless—or, 
worse than useless, dangerous and destructive. Relics of a bygone era, 
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monotheisms no longer have any place in a modern liberal society—or 
perhaps, even stronger, they are the very bane of that society—and 
therefore should be relegated to the dustbin of history. Or, so the critics 
claim.
If this were all there was to say about monotheism—if monothe-
ism has become (or always has been) truly nothing more than a system 
of intolerance—then there would be no other recourse than to join the 
critics in their call for the end of monotheism (or indeed religion itself). 
But, I suspect, not everything has been said concerning monotheism. 
Certainly, intolerance is part of monotheism’s story (an unfortunate 
part, to be sure), but it is not the whole story. There is, I want to claim, 
something more to monotheism, another part to the story that has yet 
to be told, which is worth pursuing. To make that pursuit, I want to 
turn to Sigmund Freud’s last and most fascinating book, Moses and 
Monotheism, for it is in this strange book that Freud comes to a most rel-
evant insight concerning monotheism, namely, that monotheism can-
not be all intolerant because monotheism is not all: that is, monotheism 
is not a single univocal thing, but rather something dual or equivocal.
Before going any further into this insight of Freud’s, I want to 
say a few words about the strangeness of the book itself. Moses and 
Monotheism is an odd book indeed. Freud began working on Moses and 
Monotheism in 1934, under a completely different title (The Man Moses, 
A Historical Novel). Dissatisfied with that book, Freud decided against 
publishing it. Yet he did not abandon the project altogether, but instead 
continued working on his Moses book over the next five years, under 
the growing shadow of Nazism, until finally publishing it (without 
any reference to fiction in its title) in 1939. In its final, published form, 
the book is comprised of three essays—the third of which is well over 
twice the length of the first two essays combined, begins with two pref-
aces and is interrupted halfway through by a third preface. Between 
the three parts of the book, there are numerous discrepancies—repeti-
tions, gaps, omissions—discrepancies that have led some to consider 
Moses a mere eccentricity. The real stumbling block for most, however, 
are the preposterous, even offensive, propositions that Freud puts for-
ward in its pages, the best known example of which is the infamous 
claim that the Jews had in fact murdered their leader, Moses.
A truly odd and problematic book, it is no wonder some simply 
dismiss Moses as a bizarre fantasy, a case of wild analysis, not to be 
taken as a serious commentary on the nature of monotheism. But I 
will caution against adopting such a reactionary—or, more accurately, 
defensive—posture, as it seems to me, keenly ironic that one would 
use fantasy as the pretext for rejecting a psychoanalytic interpretation 
of anything, much less monotheism.3 Indeed, as Freud himself argues, 
in Moses, an idea (whether it comes in the form of a memory, an anal-
ysand’s speech, or a book) need not be grounded in empirical fact to 
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produce insights into the nature of a thing. Or, using Freud’s own 
words, there is a difference between “material truth” and “historical 
truth,”4 and insofar as Moses does not correspond with the material 
truth, “it may be described as a delusion,” but insofar as it makes us 
attentive to something in monotheism of which we were previously 
unaware, “it must be called the truth.”5 Indeed, as I will argue below, it 
is precisely in the errors and discrepancies—in the very fantastical ele-
ments themselves—that Moses produces its insights. And if we attend 
to these Enstellungen or distortions, as Freud calls them (rather than 
use them to disqualify Moses), I believe we will find a fresh way of 
thinking and speaking about monotheism.
Towards this end, let me begin with a simple observation, one that 
anyone who has read Moses and Monotheism will no doubt have made: 
namely, that the number two recurs throughout Freud’s book. There 
is the idea that two groups of people came together to form the Jews, 
the idea that two documentary sources (the so-called J and E texts) 
inform the Bible, and of course the wild idea that there were not one, 
but two Moseses.6 From this observation, it is not difficult to reach the 
conclusion that Freud’s key insight in Moses is the presence of duality 
or equivocity in monotheism as such. That is to say, Freud does not 
deny that monotheism indeed has a tendency to become entangled 
with intolerance and exclusivity, but he also asserts that these logics 
do not comprise all there is to monotheism, that something of mono-
theism somehow always eludes their capture—or, as I put it moments 
ago, that monotheism is not one, but two. The task of this paper will 
then be to demonstrate how Freud brings equivocity out of monothe-
ism, but for now, I only want to illustrate the form of Freud’s thinking 
by turning to what is something of a sideline in his account: namely, 
Christian anti-Semitism.
After presenting Paul and Christianity as simultaneously a renewal 
and a departure from Judaism, Freud turns his attention to the topic of 
Christian anti-Semitism. The primary reason Christians hate the Jews, 
Freud claims, is that the Jews refuse to admit to having killed the pri-
mal father while Christians readily do so. But something as insidious 
as anti-Semitism, Freud suggests, must have “more than one ground,”7 
and so, he gives five additional sources for it. The first four sources 
are: the Jews’ status as permanent aliens, their unassimilable other-
ness, their claim to being “the first-born, favourite child of God,”8 and 
the practice of circumcision. What all four of these sources or grounds 
have in common is that they have to do with the attitudes or beliefs 
of individual Christians. They resent the Jews’ otherness and find cir-
cumcision uncannily reminiscent of castration, for example. The fifth 
and final ground Freud gives, however, is different. It differs because 
it does not attempt to “read the minds” of individual Christians, but 
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rather calls into question the very category of Christian itself. He 
writes: “we must not forget that all those peoples who excel to-day in 
their hatred of Jews became Christians only in late historic times, often 
driven to it by bloody coercion.”9 They are, in Freud’s words, “mis-
baptized,” only possessing “a thin veneer of Christianity.”10 As such, 
their hatred of the Jews is in actuality a displaced hatred of Christians 
themselves for having forced Christianity upon them: “They have not 
got over a grudge against the new religion which was imposed on 
them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the source from which 
Christianity reached them.”11
Many understand Freud to be a harsh critic of Christianity, and 
so the fact that he pursues the topic of Christian anti-Semitism, even 
at the cost of deviating from the mainline of his book, is not too sur-
prising. In the same way, the first four sources that Freud finds are not 
unusual. However, the fifth reason—that is, that Christian anti-Sem-
ites are Christians “misbaptized”—stands out, as it runs completely 
counter to this standard image of Freud as a critic of Christianity. By 
clarifying that Christian anti-Semites only possess “a thin veneer of 
Christianity,” that they hold the mantle of Christianity wrongly, Freud 
actually defends Christianity by distinguishing between the Christianity 
of the anti-Semites and Christianity as such. That is to say, rather than 
use anti-Semitism to eschew Christianity altogether (as contemporary 
critics of monotheism are wont to do), Freud provocatively insists on 
a difference within Christianity, between Christianity “misbaptized” 
and Christianity as such. Because of this difference, or this twoness, it 
becomes possible to challenge Christian anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism 
attempts to draw a distinction between Christians and Jews, which 
Freud wants to dismantle. However, he does not disrupt the Christian-
Jew distinction of anti-Semitism by employing either of the tactics that 
we have come to expect in today’s critical literature: that is, either by 
introducing an external counter-force (such as secularism) or by sim-
ply “deconstructing” that boundary. Rather, he does so, in a highly 
original and indeed paradoxical, if not ironic, fashion by introducing 
equivocity within Christianity itself. The Christian-Jew distinction 
of anti-Semitism can never be so stable because Christianity is never 
quite itself. Because of this twoness—call it a constitutive equivoci-
ty—Christianity finds itself on both sides of the border of anti-Semi-
tism, as both the subject of anti-Semitism as well as, paradoxically, its 
object, which enables Freud to find the possibility of solidarity where 
anti-Semitism only saw division: “Their hatred of Jews is at bottom a 
hatred of Christians, and we need not be surprised that in the German 
National-Socialist revolution this intimate relation between the two 
monotheist religions finds such a clear expression in the hostile treat-
ment of both of them.”12
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2
The idea of equivocity appears in Moses and Monotheism most explicitly 
in the form of a break between Akhenaten and Moses. Now, this claim 
will appear controversial as it goes against the way Freud’s text has 
been traditionally understood. Traditionally, Freud has been under-
stood as attempting to establish continuity between these two figures. 
For instance, Freud very clearly claims that Moses was an Egyptian, “a 
member of the royal house” and as such “close to the Pharaoh” and “a 
convinced adherent of the new religion, whose basic thoughts he had 
made his own.”13 So, how could someone of such description be said 
to have broken off with Akhenaten?
To answer this question, I want to take a closer look, not only at 
the way Freud describes Moses and Akhenaten’s relationship itself, 
but at how he describes their respective monotheisms as well. Or, to 
put it more precisely, I want to look at the incongruity between the way 
Freud characterizes these two men’s relationship, on one hand, and 
their respective monotheistic projects, on the other. For while Freud 
does indeed describe the two men as close, he also points to an import-
ant difference between the Aten religion and Judaism, which calls that 
closeness into question. This difference has to do with the permissibili-
ty of idols and idolatry. Freud writes: “Jewish monotheism behaved in 
some respects even more harshly than the Egyptian: for instance in for-
bidding pictorial representations of any kind.”14 This difference may 
appear minor, but it has profound implications on how we understand 
Moses and Akhenaten’s relationship.15
To better grasp the implications of this difference, consider the 
context in which Freud evokes Akhenaten in the first place. Freud, as 
is well known by now, wants to suggest that Judaism originated in 
Egypt. But right away he recognizes a problem with this suggestion, 
namely, “the fact of there being the most violent contrast between the 
Jewish religion which is attributed to Moses and the religion of Egypt”: 
“The former is a rigid monotheism on the grand scale” while the latter 
features “an almost innumerable host of deities of varying dignity and 
origin.”16 So obvious—or, in Freud’s words, “most violent”—is this 
contrast that Freud even suspects it of being “deliberate” and “inten-
tionally heightened.”17 Intentional or not, the dissimilarity between 
Judaism and Egyptian polytheism makes the notion of an Egyptian 
origin difficult to accept.
To make the idea of an Egyptian origin more plausible, Freud 
must find a way to account for this violent contrast. It is at this point 
that Freud turns to Akhenaten. Akhenaten was a follower of the Aten 
religion, which was a sun-cult, but more importantly, a monotheism, 
“the first attempt of the kind, so far as we know, in the history of the 
world.”18 As a monotheism, the Aten religion offers a readymade 
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explanation for how Judaism may have begun in Egypt. “This impres-
sion seems justified,” writes Freud, “if now, in making the compari-
son, we replace the Jewish religion by the Aten religion which, as we 
know, was developed by Akhenaten in deliberate hostility to the pop-
ular one.”19 The Aten religion would explain, not only how Judaism 
began in Egypt, but how it began there in contrast to polytheism. With 
this explanation in hand, all Freud must do is establish a link between 
Moses and Akhenaten.
But there is a problem with this explanation: namely, graven 
images. Akhenaten, it is true, would explain what is perhaps the most 
obvious difference between Judaism and polytheism—namely, the dif-
ference in the number of their respective deities—so it is quite under-
standable that Freud would want to bring Akhenaten into his account. 
But number is not the only contrast between Judaism and Egyptian 
polytheism that exists, nor is it, according to Freud himself, the most 
significant. An even more fundamental difference than number exists 
over the issue of graven images. Graven images in Judaism are, as it is 
well known, strictly forbidden while in polytheism “they proliferate,” 
as Freud puts it, “with the greatest luxuriance,” as if Egyptian polythe-
ists possessed (or, perhaps, were possessed by) “the insatiable appe-
tite…for embodying their gods in clay, stone and metal.”20 And while 
the Aten religion differs with polytheism over number—thus serving 
as a possible explanation for how Judaism, a monotheism, could have 
grown up in the shadow of Egyptian polytheism—it remains absolute-
ly indistinguishable from polytheism on the question of graven imag-
es, thus begging the question: if the Aten religion explains Judaism’s 
difference with polytheism on the question of number, then what 
explains Judaism’s difference with both polytheism and the Aten reli-
gion on the question of graven images?
Thus, a contradiction appears in Freud’s text. On one hand, Freud 
presents Moses as a close disciple of Akhenaten. On the other hand, he 
credits Moses with the prohibition on graven images, which suggests 
Moses opposed Akhenaten. What to make of this contradiction? The 
answer can be found in Freud himself. In his discussion of the myr-
iad of errors and contradictions that supposedly can be found in the 
Bible, Freud offers a method of interpretation that does not consider 
such distortions or Entstellungen as evidence of the Bible’s unreliability, 
but rather as so many clues that another, counter-narrative lies “sup-
pressed and disavowed hidden away”21 beneath the surface of the offi-
cial narrative.22 The task of the reader is then not to simply point out or 
inventory all of the “noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions and obvi-
ous contradictions”23 that can be found throughout the text, but rather 
to use them to reconstruct that disavowed narrative, like a detective 
reconstructing the scene of a crime from the clues that remain.
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The obvious point to be made here is that Freud’s theory of 
Entstellung is not simply a Biblical hermeneutic, but a method for 
reading the contradictions of any text, including indeed those of 
Moses and Monotheism itself. That is to say, this contradiction in the 
way Freud presents Moses—namely, the contradiction between Moses 
as Akhenaten’s disciple and Moses as inventor of the ban on graven 
images—should not be glossed over. But at the same time, it should 
not be taken as a reason to reject his account as such. The point is, 
rather, to take this contradiction as a clue that another narrative—a 
counter-narrative—exists, “suppressed and disavowed hidden away” 
within Freud’s own text. What then is this alternative narrative? Allow 
me to offer the following possibility: let us retain Freud’s original idea 
that Moses and Akhenaten were indeed close (after all, the point is not 
to dismiss the traditional reading of this text, but to supplement it).24 In 
that case, I will suggest that at some point Moses became ambivalent 
towards his master and began to rebel against him and his religion. 
Eventually, Moses made an official break from Akhenaten by estab-
lishing his own monotheism, in which he sought to “[outdo] the strict-
ness of the Aten religion.”25 The centerpiece of Moses’s monotheism 
was, of course, the ban on graven images, which was conceived as an 
expressed rejection of Akhenaten and his representational (or, to use 
Freud’s own word, sensual) theology.
What may have caused Moses to become estranged from 
Akhenaten, one may wonder? To be sure, the suggestion that Moses 
drifted away from his master is not in itself all too surprising—after 
all, was it not Freud himself who taught us that a son will wish to 
usurp his father? Freud also tells us that Moses was “ambitious and 
energetic” with dreams “of one day being the leader of his people, of 
becoming the kingdom’s ruler.”26 So, perhaps, Moses’s estrangement 
from Akhenaten was simply inevitable.
I will, however, in the spirit of “the schoolmen and Talmudists,”27 
offer one other possible motive for their estrangement, a possibility 
that has the additional benefit of explaining why Moses’s rebellion 
took the specific form of a new monotheism: namely, the possibili-
ty that Moses became disenchanted with the Aten religion itself. But 
if that was the case—if Moses did in fact become disenchanted with 
his master’s religion—then what precisely in the Aten religion drew 
Moses’s dissatisfaction? Here, once again, Freud offers the clue. When 
first introducing Akhenaten, Freud notes that the heretic king was not 
himself responsible for inventing the notion of a universal God—“For 
a considerable time,” he writes, “tendencies had been at work among 
the priesthood of the sun temple at On (Heliopolis) in the direction of 
developing the idea of a universal god.”28 Rather, he was responsible 
for something else. As Freud explains: “He introduced something new, 
which for the first time converted the doctrine of a universal god into 
monotheism—the factor of exclusiveness.”29
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What was truly innovative in Akhenaten, what turned the Aten 
religion into a genuine monotheism, according to Freud, was this 
notion that truth could not stand side-by-side with other truths, that 
truth was exclusive, which meant that all other religions or gods had 
to now be rejected as so many falsehoods—or, as Freud puts it, “in 
assessing the new doctrine a knowledge of its positive contents is not 
enough: its negative side is almost equally important—a knowledge 
of what it rejects.”30 In short, Akhenaten invented intolerance. That 
is why Akhenaten’s rule became characterized by “harshness and 
intolerance” and why throughout Egypt “temples were closed, divine 
service forbidden, temple property confiscated”:31 he could not abide 
the existence of alternative or rival accounts of the divine; they were 
for him falsehoods, and as such, they had to be eliminated. I want to 
suggest that it was precisely this exclusive or intolerant quality of the 
Aten religion that caused Moses to break with Akhenaten. Perhaps, 
when Moses saw the damage Akhenaten’s fanatical monotheism had 
done to his beloved kingdom (a kingdom that, Freud tells us, Moses 
dreamed of one day ruling), he took the decision to break with his 
master. However, instead of abandoning monotheism as a lost cause, 
Moses chose to leave Egypt with “a Semitic tribe which had immigrat-
ed into [Egypt] a few generations earlier”32 for the chance to reinvent 
monotheism. Moses believed that instead of promoting intolerance, 
divisiveness, and exclusivity, instead of promoting legalism and abso-
lutism, monotheism, at its best, could promote “the idea of a single 
deity embracing the whole world, who was not less all-loving than 
all-powerful, who was averse to all ceremonial and magic and set 
before men as their highest aim a life in truth and justice,”33 in the best 
possible senses of those terms. But for monotheism to actualize this 
potential, it would need a new starting point, and that new starting 
point would be the prohibition on graven images.34
3
For some, the Mosaic ban on graven images, which is codified in the 
second commandment of the Decalogue, may appear to be a rather 
minor feature of Judaism, but, for Freud, “the compulsion to worship 
a God whom one cannot see”35 is Judaism’s defining feature. As Freud 
tells it, the ban put Moses on a very different trajectory than Akhenaten. 
Rather than lead to ever increasing levels of intolerance and violence 
toward nonbelievers, Freud argues that the ban on graven images ini-
tiated, what he calls, the advance of intellectuality, “a triumph of intellec-
tuality over sensuality,”36 which “helped to check the brutality and the 
tendency to violence which are apt to appear where the development 
of muscular strength is the popular ideal.”37
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Though Freud is clear that the ban on graven images led to the 
so-called advance of intellectuality, he is less clear on what the advance 
of intellectuality actually was. Clearly, it was a transformation of some 
sort—Freud describes it as “a permanent imprint”38 of character—
though a transformation of what precisely, remains unclear. Freud 
also claims the advance resulted in, among other things, a “rejection 
of magic and mysticism,” an appreciation for “the possession of the 
truth,” “a high opinion of what is intellectual,” and a “stress on what 
is moral”39—all traits that, according to Freud, made the Jews more 
civilized and less violent. Freud also suggests that this advance led 
to an “inclination to intellectual interests,” which gave the Jews a 
kind of inner strength that “held the scattered people together” after 
the Romans destroyed the Temple.40 But for all that is known about 
its effects, the advance of intellectuality itself remains something of a 
mystery.
This ambiguity has to do with the German word, Geistigkeit, 
which James Strachey, the translator of the Standard Edition, renders 
as intellectuality. “The obvious alternative,” Strachey writes, “would 
be ‘spirituality’, but,” as he explains, “in English this arouses some 
very different associations.”41 Adding another layer of complication is 
the fact that Moses and Monotheism was translated into English once 
before it appeared in the Standard Edition by Katherine Jones, and in 
that edition, Jones translates Geistigkeit as spirituality without so much 
as a note.42 Whatever “associations” Strachey fears readers will make 
while reading a book about religion, Jones appears to invite. So, Der 
Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit was either a transformation of the intellect 
or it was a transformation of the spirit, and the translators do not seem 
to agree as to which it is.
Without this consensus, Strachey advises that it would be best for 
readers “to examine Freud’s own account of the concept” and “to form 
one’s conclusions on that.”43 Richard Bernstein has done exactly that. 
In his very important book The Legacy of Moses, Bernstein approach-
es the question of Geistigkeit by focusing on the contrast Freud draws 
between it and sensuality or Sinnlichkeit. “‘Sinnlichkeit’,” Bernstein 
writes, “is the standard German term for referring to the senses and to 
what can be known by sensory perception.”44 Based on this contrast, 
it seems that Freud is trying to draw a contrast “between the ‘lower’ 
form of knowledge that is grasped by the senses and a ‘higher’ form 
of abstract intellectual (spiritual) knowledge,” which would put Freud 
right in line with the tradition of German Idealism, which saw Judaism 
as promoting “intellectuality over sensibility.”45 Based on Bernstein’s 
study of the context, it would seem Strachey is quite justified in his 
choice of translation (although Bernstein, for his part, cautions that the 
English cannot fully convey “the power and dynamic quality of the 
German”46).
Cho | Monotheism and its Vicissitudes 813
However, Bernstein is not the only scholar to have examined this 
question. Yosef Yerulshami, in his landmark reappraisal of Moses and 
Monotheism, Freud’s Moses, also looks at the translation of Geistigkeit, 
and in his assessment, the word intellectuality is a poor choice of trans-
lation as it is “far too narrow and cerebral and, in the context of M.M., 
often anachronistic.”47 Thus when he cites the passage on the advance 
of intellectuality, Yerulshami simply refuses to translate Geistigkeit, in 
recognition of the way “the German word hovers between intellectu-
ality and spirituality.”48
I will not attempt to determine whether intellectuality or spiritu-
ality is the proper rendering of Geistigkeit, as I am also quite content to 
let the word continue hovering, to put it with Yerulshami, between its 
different valences. Indeed, it is quite possible that we are not meant to 
choose between these possible meanings, that Freud chose the word 
Geistigkeit precisely because of its undecideable nature. In that case, 
perhaps Freud wanted to speak to the various and disparate aspects 
of our person (to our minds as well as to our spirits, as it were) in 
order to reveal the false choices we often force ourselves to make when 
we place priority on this or that aspect of our being. Indeed, it seems 
to me quite possible that Freud chose the word Geistigkeit precisely 
to introduce or draw attention to the equivocity that constitutes our 
very subjectivity—that is, to put it more precisely, the equivocity that 
the advance of intellectuality introduced into our subjectivity, there-
by constituting it. However, I do not wish to speculate any further on 
the spiritual or intellectual implications of Geistigkeit. Rather, I want to 
draw attention to a dimension of Freud’s concept of Geistigkeit that has 
been hitherto overlooked.
Strachey, Jones, Bernstein and Yerulshami may all disagree on 
whether Geistigkeit is better translated as intellectuality or spirituali-
ty, but they all share the same assumption that at stake is a subjective 
transformation of some type. The advance of intellectuality may have 
been a transformation of the human mind or the human spirit—or 
indeed both—but it is a transformation of the human subject none-
theless. And yet, if we pay close attention to Freud’s own explanation 
of the advance, we will notice that Geistigkeit does not simply have a 
subjective meaning, but an objective one as well.
In the section on “The Advance of Intellectuality,” Freud gives a 
brief account of the origins of Geistigkeit. He writes, “Human beings,” 
at some point in history, “found themselves obliged in general to rec-
ognise ‘intellectual [geistige]’ forces—forces, that is, which cannot be 
grasped by the senses (particularly by the sight) which none the less 
produce undoubted and indeed extremely powerful effects.”49 Notice 
that here Geistigkeit is presented, not as an aspect of the human sub-
ject but of the material world itself. The natural world is not all phys-
ical or material—it possesses an element of intellectuality or, if you 
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like, spirituality. The specific example Freud gives of this Geistigkeit 
of the world is wind: “If we may rely upon the evidence of language, 
it was movement of the air that provided the prototype of intellectu-
ality [Geistigkeit], for intellect [Geist] derives its name from a breath 
of wind.”50 It would be too limiting to imagine this Geistigkeit of the 
world as a type of animism, as Freud indicates that wind is only an 
example, if the prototypical example, of an entire “world of spirits 
[Geisterreich]”51 that lies just beyond the reach of our senses. To make 
my claim even stronger: what Freud is describing here should not be 
imagined as having any correlation whatsoever with the human mind. 
Freud is not, for example, describing the Geistigkeit of the world as some 
kind of projection or stain that results when the human mind attempts 
to comprehend the world. The Geistigkeit of the world should not be 
understood in these correlative terms because Freud makes it quite 
clear that the Geistigkeit of the world existed even before human beings 
had the capacity for recognizing it and that its presence “obliged” us to 
recognize it in the first place. Indeed, Freud goes even further, suggest-
ing that it was our discovery of Geistigkeit in the world that led us to 
discover the same quality in ourselves, and not the other way around: 
“This too led to the discovery of the mind [Seele (soul)] as that of the 
intellectual [geistigen] principle in individual human beings.”52
With this account of the advance of intellectuality in hand, it is 
now clear why, in Freud’s account of monotheism, both the Egyptians 
and the Jews first reject monotheism. When Freud writes, “The Jewish 
people under Moses were just as little able to tolerate such a highly 
spiritualized religion,”53 he should not be read in the weak sense as 
suggesting that the Jews simply had a distaste for Mosaic monotheism; 
he must be read in the much stronger sense as arguing that the Jews 
(as well as the Egyptians) lacked the very subjective capacity (whether 
that capacity is defined as intellectual or spiritual in quality) for grasp-
ing it. The Jews of course would eventually acquire Geistigkeit, which 
would enable them to adopt Mosaic monotheism, albeit belatedly, but 
that acquisition—or, to use Freud’s word, advance—could only hap-
pen as a result of a direct and repeated encounter with the Geistigkeit of 
the world, an encounter that would always be too soon or premature. 
This is then how I claim Freud’s notion of the advance of intellectual-
ity must be understood: it was not simply an enlarging or enhancing 
of the intellectual (or spiritual) capacity of human beings, as if human 
beings always already possessed such a thing in the first place; but 
rather, it was much more radically the transfer of Geistigkeit from the 
objective world to the human subject as a result of a repeated encoun-
ter, and indeed a repeated traumatic encounter, with monotheism.
What does it mean to say that the material world possesses a spir-
itual aspect? The simplest approach to this question would be to read 
Geistigkeit as a kind of idealism. In that case, Freud would be read as 
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presenting this intellectuality as a kind of other worldly dimension, 
inhabited by the spectral concomitants of material objects. In fact, 
Freud appears to be describing exactly such a dimension when he 
makes reference to a Geisterreich or a “world of spirits.”54 But what 
such a reading would miss is Freud’s insistence that this spirituali-
ty of the world, while immaterial (and therefore “cannot be grasped 
by the senses (particularly by the sight)”55), is nonetheless real insofar 
as it produces “extremely powerful effects”56 in the material world. 
As such, we do not accurately grasp Freud’s Geistigkeit if we think 
of it purely in terms of philosophical idealism, as if it were a kind of 
Freudian variation on Plato’s forms. Rather, Freud’s Geistigkeit names 
that aspect of the material world that is part of the material world but 
is itself paradoxically immaterial. Or, to put it another way, Geistigkeit is 
that part of the world that subtracts itself from materiality, that decom-
pletes it, makes it not all.
4
In his discussion of Freud, in The Price of Monotheism, Jan Assmann 
begins with a retraction. In his earlier work, Assmann viewed Freud as 
a critic of monotheism, even going so far as to call him its “most out-
spoken destroyer.”57 Assmann held this view because he saw Freud’s 
Egyptian hypothesis as a direct attack on the true-false distinction, 
which Assmann takes to be the defining feature of monotheism: “What 
seems crucial to me,” Assmann writes, “is not the distinction between 
the One God and many gods but the distinction between truth and 
falsehood in religion.”58 “Moses the Egyptian,” the early Assmann 
argued, blurs the distinction between Israel and Egypt, thereby weak-
ening the links between Israel and truth, on the one hand, and Egypt 
and falsehood, on the other, as Moses “embodies what is imagined to 
be common to Ancient Egypt and Israel.”59
In The Price of Monotheism, Assmann reverses directions, claiming 
now that Freud was in fact attempting to present the true-false dis-
tinction “as a seminal, immensely valuable, and profoundly Jewish 
achievement.”60 What prompts this change in Assmann’s position is the 
second commandment, that is, the ban on graven images. In his earlier 
work, the ban on graven images made little impression on Assmann, 
as he focused almost entirely on Freud’s Egyptian hypothesis, but in 
The Price of Monotheism, the ban plays the greater part in Assmann’s 
reception of Freud: “With the ban on images, the distinction between 
true and false in the divine world, and with it the distinction between 
reason and madness, enters religion for the first time.”61 According to 
Assmann, the second commandment does more than introduce intel-
lectuality into the world; more importantly, it simultaneously identi-
fies idolatry as a false form of religion. “Each and every image…bears 
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within it the potential to be worshipped as a god,” Assmann explains.62 
“This,” he goes on, “would necessarily be an ‘other god,’ since the true 
god cannot be depicted.”63 Thus by outlawing the making of images, 
Assmann argues, Moses was, in some definitive way, rejecting all other 
gods as false gods.
I must admit, there is a certain logic to Assmann’s account. 
Intellectuality and sensuality, as Bernstein has reminded us, do indeed 
form a dualism in Freud.64 Moreover, sensuality is always portrayed 
as the baser member of the dualism—in Freud’s words, it is “lower 
psychical activity”65—while intellectuality appears as the nobler mem-
ber, trading in “ideas, memories, and inferences,”66 which can give the 
impression that Freud is simply describing the true-false binary in oth-
er terms.
However, I must quarrel with Assmann’s characterization of 
Freud’s project, for, though intellectuality and sensuality do indeed 
form a dualism in Freud, he never uses these terms as shorthand or 
synonyms for monotheism and polytheism or, even less, truth and 
falsehood itself. Quite the contrary, Freud always uses these categories 
to describe different aspects of both monotheism and polytheism. For 
example, as I have argued above, Freud does not present monotheism 
as a purely intellectual theological system. Rather, he presents it as a 
framework that is internally divided, possessing both intellectual and 
sensual elements—a division, I might add, that brings monotheism in 
closer proximity to polytheism by revealing their mutual affinity for 
sensuality. As well, with polytheism, Freud finds the presence of both 
sensual and intellectual tendencies: sensuality in the wide variety of 
idols and personifications of the divine, and intellectuality in Ma ‘at, 
which is not a personification at all, but an abstraction of truth and 
justice. Thus to describe Freud’s concept of polytheism as an exclu-
sively sensual and therefore false form of theology is dubious at best. 
Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case, as Freud not only compli-
cates how intellectuality and sensuality operates across both mono-
theism and polytheism, but he even opens up new lines of exchange 
between the two of them, citing Ma ‘at, for instance, as an important 
idea that monotheism imported from polytheism. And this, I believe, 
is the overall aim of Freud’s project: not to reinscribe the true-false dis-
tinction, much less to present this distinction as a Jewish achievement, 
as Assmann suggests, but to trouble and complicate the binaries that 
we create in order to distinguish self and other and to draw our atten-
tion to the porousness of the borders and walls we erect in an attempt 
to separate our truth from the other’s falsehood, a porousness that will 
allow for flows and exchanges (and perhaps an entire economy) to 
occur between self and other.
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5
Nowhere is Freud’s use of this dualism to complicate binaries on better 
display than in his account of the origins of the Jewish people. When 
Freud reconstructs these origins, a curious inconsistency (yet another 
one of those textual distortions) emerges. At times, Freud will refer 
to the people who left Egypt with Moses in the Exodus as Jews. But, 
then, at other times, Freud will refer to these exact same people, not as 
Jews, much less as Hebrews or Israelites, but very precisely as “Neo-
Egyptians,”67 even stating his preference for this term. What is the rea-
son for this discrepancy? It would be very easy to overlook this incon-
sistency or to explain it away simply as an error of language (i.e. Freud 
really means Jews when he writes Neo-Egyptians, and so on), but to do 
so, would be a mistake, as this explanation would miss Freud’s larger 
point about the specific composition of the Jews as a political entity.68 If 
Freud wants to call the people of the Exodus Neo-Egyptians, and not 
Jews, it is because he wants to draw attention to the composite nature 
of the Jews as a political entity. Freud will refer to the Neo-Egyptians 
as Jews from time to time because they do, in his account, form one 
part of what will eventually become the Jews. But, in his account, they 
do not become the Jews until they join a band of tribes living in “the 
stretch of country between Egypt and Canaan.”69
Special attention must be paid to this union, and in particular to 
the precise identity of these tribes with whom the Neo-Egyptians unit-
ed, as these details play a decisive part in Freud’s theory of the Jews. 
These tribes worshipped a common god, named Yahweh. “Yahweh,” 
Freud tells us, “was unquestionably a volcano god,” “an uncanny, 
bloodthirsty demon who went about by night and shunned the light 
of day.”70 Such a description is indeed unflattering, but more impor-
tantly, it is a far cry from the God of Moses, whom Freud describes as 
an abstraction that is “all-loving” and “all-powerful,” “averse to all 
ceremonial and magic” and a promoter of “a life in truth and justice.”71 
That is to say, whereas the Neo-Egyptians had, by this time, experi-
enced the advance of intellectuality, and thus began following intel-
lectual religion, the tribes with whom they united were still encaged 
within a sensual theological framework. Thus, not only are the Jews, in 
Freud’s account, a nation that “arose out of a union of two component 
parts,”72 but their union brought together (without synthesis) the two 
sides of the religious dualism, the intellectual and the sensual.
As should now be abundantly clear, the Jews, as well as Judaism, 
in Freud, never come to embody the whole truth, nor are they ever 
used to claim the true-false distinction as a profoundly Jewish project, 
as they do in Assmann, because the Jews, in Freud, are not a whole 
people in the first place, comprised fully of intellectual monotheists. 
Rather, as Edward Said has put it, the Jews are “Freud’s profound 
exemplification of the insight that even for the most definable, the 
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most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity…there are 
inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, 
and only one, Identity.”73
Care must be taken, however, so that Said (and Freud) is not mis-
understood as suggesting that the Yahwehists somehow obstruct the 
Jews from forming one, and only one, Identity, as if such a thing as 
wholeness or purity were ever possible at all in the first place. The 
Yahwehists, in Freud’s account, are not a foreign body that has become 
parasitically attached to the Jews, contaminating them with a foreign, 
and false, form of worship. Rather, Freud presents them as a constitutive 
part of the Jews as such. In other words, the Jews are the Jews precisely 
because they are “a union of two component parts,”74 that is, a union of 
the sensual Yahwehists and the intellectual Neo-Egyptians. That is to 
say, if the Jews do not form one, and only one, Identity, if they are not a 
whole people, it is because they are constitutively so—equivocity is an 
inherent part of their composition. Or, to put it in yet a different, albeit 
paradoxical, fashion: the Jews’ non-Identity is their Identity.
The fact that Freud imagines the Jews as bringing together intel-
lectual and sensual religion without effecting their synthesis—that is, 
without absorbing these opposites into a third homogenous term—
does not mean that he paints an idyllic picture of Jewish communal life. 
Indeed, the exact opposite is the case: Freud presents Jewish history as 
a series of antagonistic and tumultuous events, whether that is one 
side attempting to erase the foreign character of the other, the people 
forgetting their Mosaic commitments and the prophets emerging to 
call them back to those commitments, or the priesthood tendentiously 
rewriting Jewish history in order to fabricate a homogenous heritage. 
It means, rather, that life takes place in the midst of these differences 
and antagonisms. That is to say, communal life is possible because of 
constitutive equivocity, not in spite of it. The differences within a com-
munity do not prevent utopia, the other’s foreignness does not prevent 
the people’s wholeness; rather, it is the exact opposite: these differenc-
es, this foreignness, is precisely the stuff of life itself.
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